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Tough Love: Optimal Enforcement of Output
Quotas in the Presence of Cheating
Konstantinos Giannakas and Murray Fulton
Abstract
This study builds on the literature on the economics of output quotas in the presence of cheat-
ing. We extend previous work by Giannakas and Fulton (2000a) by examining the decisions of
the agency responsible for the enforcement of output quotas in a decentralized policy-making
structure. Enforcement policy design is modeled as a sequential game between the agency that de-
termines the enforcement of the quota program (designed by a regulator), and farmers who make
production decisions. Analytical results show that the level of enforcement depends on the size of
the enforcement costs and the political preferences of the enforcement agency - the greater is the
weight placed by the enforcement agency on producer welfare, the greater is the level of program
enforcement.
1.  Introduction 
Governments have used a variety of market intervention mechanisms to redistribute income in the 
economy. Output quotas have been widely used in a number of different areas including 
agriculture and fisheries. In agriculture, where quotas have been extensively analyzed, examples 
of supply restrictions include the tobacco and peanut programs in the United States (US), milk 
quotas in the European Union (EU), and supply management of milk, chicken and eggs in 
Canada.1 
Quotas redistribute income by restricting supply of the regulated commodity, thus raising its 
price and generating higher returns for the original quota holders. This increased price however, 
provides an incentive for producers to expand production beyond the restricted amount. And this 
supply expansion is what is generally observed. Again with reference to agriculture, violation of 
quota limits and excess production of regulated commodities are common in the EU Common 
Agricultural Policy (CAP) (Ockenden and Franklin, 1995; Gardner, 1996). This is especially true 
for the milk quotas in the Mediterranean regions. In 1997, the penalties on detected above-quota 
production of milk in Italy alone exceeded $480 million (Tagliabue, 1998). Alston (1986) reports 
that when hen quotas were used to control the egg market in the state of Victoria, Australia, the 
black market was estimated to account for 10-30% of all eggs. In contrast, over-quota chicken 
production in Canada is not rampant, although it is significant from time to time in various areas 
of the country. 
Despite the incentive for and the incidence of cheating on output quotas, this issue has 
received limited attention in the economics literature. The traditional analysis of this policy takes 
place under the unrealistic assumption of perfect and costless enforcement. An exception is the 
paper by Giannakas and Fulton (2000a) that introduces enforcement costs and cheating into the 
economic analysis of the income transfer efficiency of quotas.2 
In this paper, we extend the work of Giannakas and Fulton (2000a, GF hereafter) to include 
the optimal enforcement response to producer noncompliant behavior. In particular, unlike GF 
that examine the transfer efficiency of output quotas under different levels of exogenously 
determined policy enforcement, this paper explicitly considers the optimal degree of enforcement 
(i.e., the problem of the agency responsible for the enforcement of the quota program) when 
enforcement is costly and imperfect. 
In addition to extending the GF study to the analysis of the optimal enforcement policy in the 
presence of enforcement costs and farmer noncompliant behavior, this paper incorporates a much 
richer (and more realistic) policy making structure. In particular, GF analyzes the transfer 
efficiency effects of quota violations in a centralized policy making structure where policy design 
and implementation are the responsibility of a single agency (the government). This concentration 
of policy functions is rarely the case, however.  
The agricultural policy making structure in most developed countries, and certainly the US, 
the EU and Canada, involves a separation of powers between the agencies responsible for policy 
design and those responsible for policy enforcement. In the US, farm policy originates in 
Congress (it must also be agreed to by the President) and is implemented by the US Department 
of Agriculture (Moyer and Josling, 1990; Gardner, 1987a). In the EU, the amount of intervention 
                                                 
1 The basic analysis of agricultural policy, including quotas, is found in Gardner (1983, 1987a, 1987b). 
Analysis of the US peanut program, EU dairy policy, and Canadian supply management can be found in 
Rucker and Thurman (1990), Buckwell (1997), and Schmitz (1983), respectively.  
2 An economic analysis of cheating on different means of income redistribution (such as coupled and 
decoupled farm subsidies) can be found in Giannakas and Fulton (2000b, 2002). Cheating on farm 
subsidies translates into a misrepresentation (i.e., false reporting) of the farm characteristic on which 
payments are based and, unlike cheating on output quotas, it does not affect the actual production of the 
subsidized commodity.      
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 is decided by the Council of Agricultural Ministers and the policy is implemented by the member 
countries of the EU, each of which differ significantly in the political weight they assign to their 
respective farm sectors (Swinbank, 1997; From and Stava, 1993). In Canada, agricultural policy 
legislation is introduced by the Cabinet to the House of Commons, which must pass it before it 
becomes law and is put into effect by Agriculture and Agri-Food Canada. Within this general 
framework, the year-to-year administration may be further devolved. For supply management, for 
instance, provincial quotas for chicken are set by a national agency, while the provincial 
marketing boards are responsible for enforcing these quotas. 
To capture this separation of powers, an institutional arrangement characterized by 
decentralized policy making is adopted in this study. This richer policy making structure, which 
considers separately the decisions of the policy maker and the policy enforcer, is required because 
differences in the political preferences of the enforcement agency are shown to significantly 
affect the level of enforcement and the incidence of output quotas.3   
Enforcement policy design is modeled in this paper as a sequential game between an 
enforcement agency that determines the level of enforcement of the quota program (designed by 
the regulator at an earlier stage in the game), and the farmers who make the production decisions. 
The payoff functions of the enforcement agency and the farmers are assumed to be common 
knowledge. The enforcement agency moves first and decides on the degree to which the quota 
will be enforced, knowing exactly how her choices will affect the producer optimizing decisions 
and welfare. Once the enforcement policy is determined, the producers decide on the quantity to 
produce while observing both the quota level and the enforcement policy in place. Different 
scenarios concerning the political preferences of the enforcement agency and the decision 
variables (i.e., enforcement parameters) it controls are examined within this framework. 
To avoid Nash equilibria involving non-credible strategies, all formulations of the sequential 
game developed in the paper are solved using backwards induction (Gibbons, 1992). Thus, the 
paper is structured so that the problem of the farmers is considered first, followed by the solution 
to the enforcement agency’s problem. This latter outcome determines the subgame perfect 
equilibrium enforcement and production of the commodity. The welfare effects of enforcement 
costs and cheating are considered in the context of a static, partial equilibrium, closed economy 
model. 
The title of the paper stems from a major result of the analysis, namely that quota 
enforcement increases with the weight placed by the enforcement agency on producer welfare. 
The paper shows that although violation of the quota limit might be optimal for the individual 
producer, producer welfare falls when over-production of the regulated commodity occurs. Thus, 
an enforcement agency operating with the interests of producers in mind will practice "tough 
love" – restricting the very actions that producers would prefer to undertake. 
 
 
2.  Output Quotas and Producer Behavior4  
Output quotas have traditionally been a common means of market intervention by policy makers 
who desire to transfer income to agricultural producers. Supply restrictions result in surplus 
transfers from consumers to producers through their effect on market price while they do away 
with the need for policy makers to raise funds through taxation. Figure 1 depicts the traditional 
                                                 
3 Note that, by considering a centralized policy making structure, the analysis of GF implicitly assumes 
identical political preferences of the regulatory and enforcement agencies involved in agricultural policy 
making.  
4 The analysis in this section is an expanded (detailed) version of the producer problem analyzed in GF and 
it is presented here for completeness of exposition.  
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 static, partial equilibrium welfare effects of an output quota scheme for a closed economy with 
linear approximations of supply and demand curves (Nerlove, 1958; Wallace, 1962).  
 
 
 
  
 
 
 
 
    
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
Figure 1: Welfare Effects of Output Quotas. 
 
Assuming that producers are the residual claimants of the returns generated from the sales of 
the product less the cost associated with its production,5 a quantity restriction at Q  increases 
producer surplus by the area p( Q )ADpe-DBC while consumer losses from the increased 
prevailing market price are given by the area p( Q )ABpe. The distortions in the use of productive 
resources under the program generate a deadweight welfare loss (DWL). The distortionary cost of 
market intervention is equal to the triangle ABC. The policy mechanism has no effect on the 
welfare of taxpayers; income is redistributed directly from consumers to producers. The implicit 
assumption in this analysis is that producers comply completely with the provisions of the farm 
program, i.e., farmers do not cheat. 
                                                 
5 This assumption covers the case when the producers and quota holders are the same person; it also covers 
the case when the producer leases the quota from the quota holder at a fixed quota rental rate. 
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 As pointed out by GF, however, given the increased benefits from the quota program, 
producers may find it economically optimal to cheat by violating the quota limit, i.e., to over-
produce and sell the above-quota amount through alternative channels. Assuming that producers 
know with certainty the (distorted) market price, the penalty charged per unit of over-produced 
and detected quantity, and the probability that they will be investigated, the decision of the 
individual producer as to whether he will over-produce (and if so, by how much) can be modeled 
as decision making under uncertainty.  
Assuming producer neutrality toward risk, the producer has the choice between a certain 
outcome (i.e., his profits if he does not cheat) and the expected payoff in case of over-production. 
The expected benefits for the producer that violates the quota limit are given by the revenues 
from production, minus the cost of production and the expected penalty on above-quota quantity. 
More specifically, the problem faced by the representative risk-neutral producer of the regulated 
commodity can be written as: 
 
[ ] ( )( ) ( ) mmmmq qqqcqqQQpEm δρπ −+−++=max    (1) 
 
where mq  is the quantity produced by the representative farmer over and above his quota limit q  
(the total quantity produced is q* = q + mq  ); ( )mQQp +  is the market price when the industry 
quota is set at Q  and the aggregate amount of cheating by the N representative producers equals 
mQ ; c(•) is the cost function; ρ is the penalty per unit of over-produced and detected quantity; 
and δ is the probability that the producer will be detected (and penalized) in case he cheats on the 
farm program.6 Implicit in the formulation of the problem presented in equation (1) is the 
assumption that the representative producer holds competitive conjectures; he does not perceive 
that he has any impact on aggregate output. 
The detection probability takes values between zero and one (i.e., δ∈[0, 1]), and is assumed 
to be a linear function of the quantity over-produced, i.e., mq10 δδδ += . This formulation of the 
detection probability captures the idea that the more a producer cheats, the greater is the 
likelihood that cheating will be detected (see GF). The intercept of the detection probability 
function, 0δ , reflects the probability that the farmer will be audited.7  
The slope of the detection probability function (i.e., the change in δ caused by a change in 
quantity over-produced), 1δ , is assumed strictly positive and exogenous to policy enforcers. The 
parameter 1δ  is assumed to depend on the observability of producers’ actions by third parties and 
                                                 
6 The model in equation (1) can be modified to include aversion toward risk by the representative producer 
and/or private costs from cheating. The risk averse farmer chooses mq  to maximize his expected utility 
(i.e., ( )[ ] ( ) ( )( ) ( )[ ] ( )( ) ( )[ ]mmmmmmmq qqqcqqQQpUqqcqqQQpUUEm ρδδπ −+−++++−++−= 1max ). 
The aversion of the representative farmer toward risk results in reduced cheating relative to the risk neutral 
producer of the regulated commodity. Cheating is also reduced when potential costs incurred by producers 
in protecting themselves from detection (i.e., µ( mq )) are incorporated into the representative producer’s 
objective function. Even though both risk averse behavior and private costs from cheating change the 
results quantitatively, the qualitative nature of the results in this study remains unaffected.    
7 In the context of this paper, audits are regarded as random; policy enforcers determine and announce the 
number of producers that will be investigated, N~ , and the identities of the particular producers are 
determined at random. On this basis, for any particular producer, the probability of being audited, 0δ , is 
given by the percentage of the farmers that will be investigated, i.e., NN~0 =δ . 
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 the social attitudes towards cheating; the degree to which the third party that observes the illegal 
behavior will report it to policy enforcers. The very existence of a USDA “hotline” where cases 
of “fraud” can be reported (obviously by third parties) indicates that the variable component of 
the detection probability is considered an important element of policy enforcement (USDA Office 
of Inspector General, 2001).  
Optimization of the representative producer’s objective function yields the following first 
order condition for a maximum: 
 ( ) ( ) ( )ρδδ mmm qqqcQQp 10 2' +++=+      (2) 
 
Equation (2) indicates that the farmer will produce up to the point where the market price 
(presumed by the producer to be exogenous), ( )mQQp + , equals the marginal cost (mc) of 
production, ( )mqqc +' , plus the marginal penalty ( ) .2 10 ρδδ mq+ The marginal penalty, mp, is the 
change in the expected penalty function for a change in the above-quota production, where the 
expected penalty function is mqpf δρ= . 
Aggregating over the N representative producers of the regulated commodity and assuming 
symmetry at equilibrium, the total over-quota production, ( )mm NqQ = , is given by the expression  
 ( ) ( ) ( )ρδδ mmm QQQCQQp '10 2' +++=+     (3) 
 
where ( )mQQC +' is the industry supply curve and N1'1 δδ = .  
Figure 1 graphs equation (3). The equilibrium production, Q* ( )mQQ += , is determined by 
the intersection of the (downward sloping) demand curve, D, with the vertical summation of the 
industry supply curve, S, and the MP curve. The MP curve is the horizontal summation of 
individual producers’ mp curves. The D and S curves are assumed linear while the linearity of the 
MP curve comes from the fact that the penalty function is quadratic in mQ . The MP curve has the 
same intercept as the average penalty function, ( )ρδδ mQAPF '10+= , when those are graphed 
relative to the origin of Q  in Figure 1, while the slope of the MP curve is twice the slope of the 
APF. Although linearity of D, S, and MP has been employed for the purposes of this paper, more 
general formulations can be used without changing the qualitative nature of our results. 
For linear approximations of the demand and supply curves (i.e., **)( 10 QaaQD +=  and 
**)( 10 QbbQS +=  where 11 0 ba <<  and 00 ba > ), the aggregate above-quota production is: 
 
   
( )( )
ρδ
ρδ
'
111
011
2+−
−−−=
ab
QQab
Q
e
m             (4) 
 
where eQ  is the undistorted equilibrium production. All other variables are as previously defined.  
Equation (4) indicates that the above-quota production depends on market conditions, the 
policy variable ( Q ), and the detection probability and penalty parameters. With respect to the 
enforcement parameters, the analysis indicates that mQ  will be positive when 0δ  is less than 
( )( ) ρQQab e −− 11  (or, alternatively, when ρ is less than ( )( ) 011 δQQab e −− ). These critical 
values of 0δ  and ρ are denoted as nc0δ  and ncρ  respectively, where the superscript nc stands for 
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 no cheating.8 Of course, values of the enforcement parameters in excess of nc0δ  or ncρ  result in 
complete deterrence of cheating (i.e., 0=mQ ).   
Comparative static results can be seen by examining Figure 1. An increase in 0δ  results in a 
parallel upwards shift of the S+MP curve in Figure 1 and reduced cheating. An increase in ρ 
increases both the intercept and the slope of the S+MP curve; the intercept shifts upwards while, 
at the same time, the curve rotates leftwards. The result is a lower over-produced quantity and 
hence a lower total output.  
When the combination of policy variables and enforcement parameters is such that cheating 
occurs, the welfare effects of the policy instrument change. Figure 1 shows the welfare effects of 
cheating on output quotas. Relative to the “perfect and costless enforcement” situation examined 
in the traditional analysis of output quotas, cheating results in reduced producer surplus, increased 
consumer surplus and the introduction of taxpayers among the interest groups of the policy.  
In particular, for above-quota production mQ , producers lose the area p( Q )AEp(Q*)-EFHI 
and consumers gain the area p( Q )AFp(Q*).9 Taxpayers gain the area CGHI that corresponds to 
penalty payments on detected above-quota quantity. There are also the resource costs of 
monitoring and enforcement that, though not present in Figure 1, have to be taken into account. 
These costs, denoted as ( )0δΦ , are assumed to be a non-decreasing function of 0δ  (i.e., ( ) 0' 0 ≥Φ δ , ( ) 0" 0 ≥Φ δ ) and have to be included into both taxpayer costs10 and welfare losses 
from market intervention. Specifically, the change in taxpayer surplus in the presence of cheating 
equal (1+d)[CGHI- ( )0δΦ ] where d is the marginal deadweight loss from taxation (Fullerton, 
1991; Ballard and Fullerton, 1992).11 Finally, the DWL of market intervention is decreased by 
area AFGC and increased by ( ) ( )01 δΦ+ d  relative to the “costless deterrence” approach.  
Before moving into the analysis of the optimal decisions of the agency responsible for the 
enforcement of the quota program, it is important to emphasize that, while above-quota 
production is the optimal decision for the individual producer that holds competitive conjectures 
(since this extra production is not perceived as affecting the market conditions), aggregate 
noncompliance increases total production and reduces price and total producer welfare. Note that 
this situation is similar in spirit to the well-known outcome of the Prisoners’ Dilemma. While 
there is no strategic interdependence between agricultural producers/quota holders in the case 
examined in this paper (i.e., farmers do not believe that their actions affect the payoff of other 
producers), the outcome of their optimizing behavior is a Pareto inferior situation characterized 
by welfare losses for producers as a whole. 
                                                 
8 Assuming that the per unit penalty exceeds the gains by producers in violating the quota limit at the 
margin (i.e., ( ) ( ) ( )( )QQabQcQp e −−=−> 11'ρ ), implies that nc0δ  is less than one. 
9 Recall that the welfare of producers is maximized at the monopoly output. Any increase of the supplied 
quantity above the monopoly output results in reduced producer surplus. Thus, above-quota production 
reduces producer surplus whenever the regulated quantity is set at, or more than, the monopoly output.  
10 An alternative scenario could be the one where the enforcement costs are incurred by the producers of 
the regulated commodity. In such a case, ( )0δΦ  is subtracted from producer surplus and the taxpayers are 
the net beneficiaries of the program receiving the revenues from penalties (i.e., area CGHI).  
11 It should be mentioned that there are also fixed budgetary costs arising from the operation of the agency 
responsible for agricultural policy enforcement. These costs are not associated with the existence of a 
specific farm program, however. Instead, the operation of the enforcement agency is due to government 
intervention in agriculture. Since the existence of the enforcement agency is not contingent upon the 
presence of any farm program in particular, the fixed costs from the operation of the enforcement agency 
are not incorporated into the taxpayer costs from output restrictions. 
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 3.  Optimal Enforcement by the Enforcement Agency  
The analysis above shows that the above-quota production depends on the quota level Q  set by 
the regulator and the detection probability and penalty parameters 0δ , '1δ , and ρ (see equation 
(4)). The penalty ρ on detected above-quota quantities is usually set elsewhere in the legal system 
and is therefore exogenous to agricultural policy enforcers,12 as is the detection probability 
parameter '1δ . With the enforcement parameters '1δ  and ρ being exogenous, the only avenue 
policy enforcers have for influencing producer behavior is through the choice of the audit 
probability 0δ . 
This section of the paper examines the problem of the enforcement agency as it determines 
the optimal enforcement of an output quota Q  set by the regulator, knowing exactly how its 
decisions will affect the behavior of the farmers and the welfare of all interest groups borne by 
the policy. In particular, the objective of the enforcement agency is the determination of the audit 
probability that maximizes its objective function. For linear approximations of the supply and 
demand curves, the problem of the enforcement agency can be written as: 
 
[ ]
( )[ ] [ ] ( )
( ) ( ) ( ){ }
( )( )
( )( )
ρδ
ρδ
ρδ
δρδδ
ρδδθ
θδ
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ab
QQab
Qts
QQd
QQQQbaQQQab
QQak
TSPSkCSW
e
e
m
mm
mmm
e
m
m
−−≤
+−
−−−=
Φ−+++
+


 +−+

 −++−+
+


 +−=
=++=
11
0
'
111
011
0
'
10
'
10
2
1111
2
1
2
..
1
2
1
2
1
max
0
   (5) 
 
where CS, PS and TS stand for consumer surplus, producer surplus and taxpayer surplus 
respectively. The parameters θ and k represent the weights placed by the enforcement agency on 
producer surplus and consumer surplus respectively. All other variables are as previously defined. 
The problem specified in equation (5) is a simple, static optimization problem with both 
equality and non-equality constraints. The equality constraint reflects the reaction function of the 
producers of the regulated commodity (equation (4)). The non-equality constraint requires that 
the optimal audit probability should not exceed the level that eliminates cheating. The reasoning 
is as follows. Since monitoring requires resources, the only effect of an increase in 0δ  above nc0δ  
would be the growth of ( )0δΦ . Alternatively, the inequality constraint can be seen as requiring 
mQ  to be greater than, or equal to, zero.  
                                                 
12 The optimal enforcement of output quotas when penalties are endogenous to policy enforcers is 
considered in the next section of the paper.  
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 Assuming enforcement costs of the form ( ) 2200 ψδδ =Φ  (where ψ is a strictly positive scalar 
depending on things like the agrarian structure and the number of producers),13 the Lagrangean of 
the enforcement agency’s problem is: 
 
[ ] ( )[ ] [ ]
[ ] ( ){ } ( ) ( )( ) 



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e
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e
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while the Kuhn-Tucker conditions for a maximum are: 
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Solving the optimality conditions for 0δ  it can be shown that, for given market conditions 
and resource costs of monitoring, the optimal audit probability depends on the relative weight 
placed by policy enforcers on the welfare of the producers of the commodity. More specifically, 
the K-T conditions imply that whenever θ is less than a critical value cθ , where 
 
( )( )( ) ( )[ ]
k
Qa
abQQabd e
c +−
++−−−+= ρ
ρρδψθ
1
2'
11111 21    (6) 
 
0δ  will equal: 
 
( ) ( ) ( ) ( ) ( ) ( )( )[ ]
( ) ( ) ( ) ( ) 2'1121'11122'111
'
11111
2'
11
2
11111
0
2221
22)1(
θρρδρρδρρδψ
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
 +−++−+
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13 When the enforcement agency audits N~  producers the cost of program enforcement with audit 
probability 0δ  can be written as )(~)( 00 δφδ N=Φ  where )( 0δφ  is the cost incurred by the enforcement 
agency per producer. The cost per producer when the agency enforces an audit probability of 0δ  can be 
expressed as 00 )( ζδδφ =  where ζ depends on things like the agrarian structure, the dispersion of the 
farms, etc. The total enforcement costs can then be written as 200)( ζδδ N=Φ . Setting 2ψζ =N  we get 
the expression of the enforcement costs used in this paper.  
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 If θ is greater than or equal to cθ , cheating will be completely deterred by an audit probability 
that equals nc0δ , i.e., 
 
( )( )
ρδ
θθ QQab ec −−=≥ 110      (8) 
 
where the superscripts denote the relative weight placed by the enforcement agency on the 
welfare of producers of the regulated commodity. 
The optimality conditions indicate that an increase in θ increases the optimal enforcement 
(i.e., 00 >< ∂θ∂δ θθ c ) and the likelihood that cheating will be completely deterred (i.e., the 
likelihood that θ ≥ cθ ). Since cθ  is an increasing function of ψ and k, the likelihood that cheating 
will be completely deterred falls with an increase in either the resource costs of monitoring and/or 
the weight placed on consumer welfare. The reasoning is as follows. In the previous section it has 
been shown that the greater is the above-quota production, the lower is the producer surplus and 
the greater is the consumer surplus. Therefore, increased significance of producers dictates 
increased enforcement and reduced cheating while increased significance of consumers dictates 
the opposite.14 
Based on the previous results it is easy to determine the optimal enforcement in the limiting 
case where the enforcement agency places no weight on producers and consumers of the 
regulated commodity but its objective instead is to minimize taxpayer costs from cheating.15 In 
such a case, the level of monitoring is derived by substituting zero for θ and k into equation (7) 
i.e.,  
 
( ) ( )[ ] [ ]ρδρρδψ ρδ θ '11122'111
2
110
0
22 +−++−
−−===
abab
QQab ek      (9) 
 
where the superscript denotes the weight attached by the enforcement agency to producers and 
consumers.  
Equation (9) indicates that when θ=k=0 the optimal enforcement is always positive while, 
comparing 00
==kθδ  to nc0δ , it can be shown that 00 ==kθδ  will always be less than the 0δ  that 
completely deters cheating. Thus, the optimal policy under θ=k=0 will always involve allowance 
of some cheating. Since the weight placed by policy enforcers on producer surplus is the lowest 
possible, the level of enforcement is minimized. Obviously, taxpayers incur a loss whenever the 
                                                 
14 An alternative interpretation of the optimality conditions is as follows. For given market conditions and 
weights on the interest groups (θ and k), the optimal 0δ  will be given by equation (7) whenever the 
resource costs of monitoring (ψ) are greater than a critical value cψ  where 
( )( )( ) ( )[ ] ( )( )( )( )[ ]QQababdQkaQQabd eec −+−−+−−−−+−= ρδρθρψ '1111121211 211 . For relatively low 
enforcement costs (i.e., ψ ≤ cψ ) the optimal response of the enforcement agency will be the complete 
deterrence of cheating (i.e., 0δ = nc0δ ). 
15 The payoff function of the enforcement agency when θ=k=0 is measured by the regulator’s revenues net 
of monitoring costs. Alternatively, the enforcement agency can be seen as seeking the 0δ  that minimizes 
the total budgetary costs from cheating, i.e., the resource costs of investigation minus the penalties 
collected from producers detected cheating. 
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 optimal 0δ  is greater than 00 ==kθδ , i.e., the enforcement costs exceed the budgetary benefits from 
enforcement. 
Manipulating 
0δL  it can be shown that when θ∈[0, cθ ), the optimal monitoring is determined 
by equating the marginal benefits from enforcement ( eMB ) with the marginal costs of 
enforcement ( eMC ),16 i.e.,  
 
( ) ( ) ( ) ( ) ( ) ( )( )[ ]
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where the terms on the LHS and the RHS of the equation sign are the eMB  and the eMC  
respectively. The marginal benefits from enforcement include penalties collected on detected 
above-quota quantities and the benefits from induced honesty. These latter benefits include the 
consequences for interest group welfare of increased enforcement and reduced above-quota 
production. Graphically, the eMB  curve can be seen as a linear downward sloping straight line in 
the relevant area for program enforcement (i.e., 0≤ 0δ ≤ nc0δ ). The eMB  curve is downward 
sloping due to the decrease in cheating caused by increases in 0δ . 
The position of the eMB  curve depends on the relative weights placed by the enforcement 
agency on the well being of the interest groups, while the resource costs of monitoring determine 
the position (slope) of the eMC  curve. When the enforcement agency places no weight on 
producers and consumers, the optimal 0δ  is determined by the intersection of the eMC  curve 
with the 0==keMBθ  curve (Figure 2, Panel (a)). 
An increase in the relative value of θ will shift the eMB  curve upwards, increasing both its 
intercept and its slope.17 For a positive, but relatively low θ (i.e., θ∈(0, cθ )), 0δ  is determined by 
the intersection of the ceMB
θθ<  curve and the eMC  curve in Panel (a) of Figure 2. When θ is 
relatively high (i.e., θ > cθ ), the optimal 0δ  will equal nc0δ  since, in this case, the eMB  and 
eMC  curves do not intersect inside the relevant region for policy enforcement (i.e., the area to 
the left of nc0δ ). Note that the eMC  curve meets the eMB  curve at nc0δ  whenever θ = cθ . 
Obviously, for any given θ∈[0, cθ ), the greater are the resource costs of monitoring, the greater is 
the slope of the eMC  curve, and the lower is the level of enforcement.18 
                                                 
16 Note that when cθθ < , nc000 δδ << . From K-T conditions 0δL  and λ will equal to zero.  
17 The reverse is true for an increase in the weight placed on consumers. An increase in k will shift the MBe 
downwards by decreasing its intercept and slope resulting in lower cθ and, thus, reduced likelihood that 
cheating will be deterred. 
18 Notice that while Panel (a) of Figure 2 illustrates the case of increasing marginal enforcement costs, the 
marginal costs from enforcement can in fact be constant. In such a case, the relevant MCe curve is a 
horizontal line that meets the vertical axis in Panel (a) of Figure 2 at the level of the constant marginal 
costs.  
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Figure 2:  Optimal Enforcement and Strategic Interdependence between the Enforcement 
Agency and the Farmers. 
 
Figure 2 also graphs the strategic interdependence between the enforcement agency and the 
producers; it shows the effect enforcement decisions have on cheating. Panel (b) depicts the 
cheating equilibrium for the N representative producers. The above-quota production mQ  is 
determined by the intersection of the industry demand curve with the relevant S+MP curve i.e., 
the cMPS θθ≥+ , cMPS θθ<+ , or the 0==+ kMPS θ  curve depending on the political preferences of 
policy enforcers. An increase in 0δ  causes a parallel upward shift of the S+MP curve which 
results in reduced above-quota production.  
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 Mathematically, the equilibrium mQ  under the alternative scenarios concerning the weights 
placed by policy enforcers on the welfare of the interest groups can be derived by substituting the 
relevant 0δ  into the producers’ reaction function in equation (4). Since enforcement increases 
with an increase in the relative weight placed by policy enforcers on producer surplus, the greater 
is θ, the lower is the above-quota production (i.e., 0==kmQθ > cmQ θθ< > cmQ θθ≥ = 0). 
Overall, for any given output quota, the greatest monitoring and the lowest over-production 
will occur when producer surplus is weighted highly and consumer surplus has no weight for 
program enforcers. On the other hand, enforcement is minimized and cheating is maximized 
when the enforcement agency places no weight on producers and consumers.19     
 
 
4.  Extension of the Model - Endogenous Penalties  
The previous analysis and results are based on the assumption that penalties are exogenous to 
agricultural policy enforcers. This is generally the case since, as pointed out previously, penalties 
are typically set by the legal system. However, to complete the analysis of the optimal 
enforcement of output quotas, it is useful to consider the case where policy enforcers have control 
over penalties as well as the audit probability.  
The main implication of endogenizing penalties is that, if there are no economic costs 
associated with setting ρ, policy enforcement becomes costless. In particular, since both 0δ  and ρ 
affect farmers’ production decisions, the enforcement agency could achieve its objectives by 
substituting costly monitoring with costless penalties. 
To show this result, note that endogenizing penalties requires another K-T condition to the 
optimization problem of the enforcement agency presented by equation (5), i.e., 
 
ρL  ≤ 0,     ρ ≥ 0 →   ρL ρ = 0 
 
Obviously, the optimal choice of an enforcement agency that places a relatively high weight on 
producer surplus would still be the complete deterrence of cheating. In this case however, the 
induced producer compliance will be achieved by the establishment of a very tiny probability of a 
very severe penalty on above-quota quantities. More specifically, whenever θ is greater than or 
equal to a critical value ρθ c , where  
 
( )( )( )
( ) ( ) e
e
c
QabQab
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1111
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21
−−−
−−−+=ρθ      (10) 
 
the solution to the enforcement agency’s problem is: 
 
∞=≥≥ ρρ θθθθ ρδ cc0  (with 00 =≥
∞→≥
ρ
ρθθ
θθ
ρ
δ c
c
Limit )    (11) 
 
                                                 
19 The above result holds whenever the weight placed on producer welfare, θ, is greater than or equal to the 
weight placed on consumers, k. In a situation where k >θ, the minimum enforcement and the maximum 
production will occur when the enforcement agency places zero weight on producers and positive weight 
on consumers. This is not however, a realistic assumption for a developed country’s agricultural policy 
makers. 
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 When, however, θ is less than ρθ c , program enforcement is imperfect and some cheating 
occurs. The optimal enforcement consists of (almost) zero 0δ  and a positive but smaller than 
ncρ  penalty, i.e., 
  00 ≅<
ρθθδ c  and       (12) 
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Consistent with a priori expectations, an increase in the weight placed by program enforcers 
on producer welfare increases both the program enforcement and the likelihood that cheating will 
be completely deterred (i.e., the likelihood that θ ≥ ρθ c ). Since the enforcement of output quotas 
will be perfect and costless when θ ≥ ρθ c , one interpretation of the assumption of “perfect and 
costless policy enforcement” that is implicit in the traditional analysis of output quotas is that 
enormous fines can be costlessly levied on producers that violate their quota limit.20 
 
 
5.  Concluding Remarks  
Quotas have been commonly used by governments as a means of redistributing income in the 
economy. The increased price associated with supply restrictions creates an incentive for 
producers of the regulated commodity to cheat on the program by producing over and above the 
quota limit. Despite the incentives for, and the incidence of cheating on output quotas, the 
traditional analysis of the policy takes place under the assumption of perfect and costless 
enforcement. 
This paper develops a sequential game theoretic model of decentralized policy making to 
examine the optimal enforcement and incidence of output quotas in the presence of enforcement 
costs and producer noncompliance with the provisions of the policy mechanism. While the focus 
in the paper is on agriculture, an area in which quotas are extensively used, the analysis applies to 
other situations where quotas are used, such as fisheries.  
Analytical results show that, while violation of the quota limit might be optimal for the 
individual producer that holds competitive conjectures, above-quota production depresses the 
market price and results in welfare losses for the producers and gains for the consumers of the 
regulated commodity. The optimal level of enforcement (and, thus, cheating) depends on the 
relative weights placed by policy enforcers on the welfare of the interest groups, and the resource 
costs of monitoring producer compliance with the terms of the quota program. The greater is the 
weight placed by the enforcement agency on producer welfare and/or the lower are the 
monitoring costs, the greater is the level of enforcement of the output quota scheme. For given 
enforcement costs, enforcement of quotas is maximized when the enforcement agency places a 
high weight on producer welfare. 
In addition to analyzing the optimal enforcement and incidence of output quotas, this paper 
highlights the conditions under which cheating is likely to be an issue. The section on 
Endogenous Penalties shows that if it is possible to costlessly levy enormous fines, then cheating 
will be effectively deterred in those situations where policy enforcers place a relatively high 
                                                 
20 Graphically, infinite per unit penalty results in an infinite slope of the S+MP curve faced by the 
producers of the regulated commodity.  
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 weight on the surplus of producers. In short, the ability to levy very large fines essentially means 
that quota enforcement can be made both perfect and costless. 
This result, however, raises the question as to whether large fines for quota limit violations 
are reasonable. The literature on the economics of crime provides some guidance and evidence on 
this issue. Specifically, it has been argued that severe punishment for minor law violations (i.e., 
Becker’s (1968) “optimal fine” result) is neither costless, credible nor just. The imposition of 
disproportionate fines would likely offend the public sense of justice; in short, justice requires 
that the punishment fit the crime (Carr-Hill and Stern, 1977; Stern, 1978; Stigler, 1970. On this 
point see also Shavell (1987), Kemp and Ng (1979), Polinsky and Shavell (1979), Landes and 
Posner (1975), Singh (1973), Tullock (1971), and Cowell (1990)). 
If induced compliance through the establishment of enormous and costless fines is indeed 
infeasible, then cheating on output quotas will always be an issue and should be incorporated into 
economic analysis. This paper shows that cheating has important effects on the incidence of the 
policy, effects that vary with the political preferences of policy enforcers and the size of 
enforcement costs. 
In addition to providing an understanding of the causes and consequences of cheating on 
output quotas, the results of this study can assist in explaining potential differences in compliance 
with policy rules observed in different areas/countries. Differences in the structure of the 
agricultural sector and the efficiency of institutions could account for differences in enforcement 
costs. Obviously, the greater is the number of producers of the regulated commodity and the more 
dispersed are the farms, the greater are the monitoring costs (the parameter ψ in the models in this 
study). Increased monitoring costs mean less auditing and more cheating. Moreover, the smaller 
is the proportion of farm population, and/or the greater is the (perceived) difference between farm 
and non-farm incomes, and/or the more effective is the farm lobby, the more important politically 
the sector is expected to be (Becker, 1983; Gardner, 1987b). Increased weight on producers (i.e., 
a larger θ) is translated into more enforcement and less cheating.  
The pattern of excess quota production outlined in the examples in the Introduction is 
consistent with these results. The relatively low amount of above-quota production in the 
Canadian chicken industry can be interpreted in part as a consequence of enforcement having 
been devolved to the provincial market boards – since producers operate these boards, the weight 
attached to producer welfare can be expected to be high. As well, the cost of monitoring is 
expected to be relatively low, given the small number of chicken producers in any given province 
and the ease with which over-production can be detected.21 In the Italian milk case, the weight 
attached to producers can also be expected to be high, since the Italian government has a history 
of providing strong support to its agricultural producers. However, the large number of dairy 
producers in that country likely means that the cost of monitoring is high. As was shown, high 
monitoring costs translate into reduced enforcement, all other things the same. 
There are limitations in the current study. As was posed at the outset, the focus of this study 
has been on the economic causes and consequences of farmer noncompliant behavior. Morality 
and culture, though significant determinants of individual behavior, are not incorporated into this 
analysis. For instance, there are many producers whose disutility from cheating would outweigh 
any expected benefit from violating the program rules. Simply put, there are people that would 
never cheat (for a discussion of the role of social conscience as a general deterrent to crime see 
Grasmick and Green (1980)). By focusing on the representative producer, the effects of personal 
attributes on cheating are not considered. Extensions of the model to account for producer 
heterogeneity and culture could provide a better understanding of the causes of cheating and 
                                                 
21 For instance, there are 2,815 chicken producers and 135 poultry processing plants (many of these are 
owned by one of the largest six processors) in all of Canada in 2002 (Chicken Farmers of Canada). 
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 assist in further explaining discrepancies in terms of policy compliance observed between 
different areas/countries.  
Finally, an interesting extension of this line of research involves the analysis of the optimal 
policy intervention, income redistribution, and transfer efficiency of output quotas in the 
decentralized policy making environment considered in this paper. The study of the optimal 
regulatory responses to enforcement imperfections and the efficiency of the policy mechanism in 
redistributing income in the economy are the subject of a companion article that is forthcoming in 
the next issue of this journal. 
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